In the decades leading up to the global financial crisis (GFC), global trade grew roughly twice as fast as global output. But in the five years before 2016, trade mostly underperformed activity, prompting many to call the end of globalisation. We indulged in those discussions ourselves eighteen months ago. These calls, it seems, were premature.
2017 looks set to mark the first year of an emerging market (EM) growth pick-up after six years of successive slowdowns. The growth acceleration is not only driven by the high-profile recoveries of Russia and Brazil, but comprises about 70% of the EM universe. So what could lie in store for EM in both the short and medium term?
This is the fourth and last in a series of blogs that looks at the risk of a hard landing in the Chinese economy. One problem when assessing this risk is the lack of historical precedents. Very few countries underwent debt build-ups of Chinese proportions, and those that did were usually very small, open economies. The one exception is 1990 Japan which displays some striking similarities with today’s China.
This is the third in a series of blogs that looks at the risks of a Chinese hard landing. In the first we argued that China still has important defences in the form of fiscal space. In the second, we discussed why the odds of financial crisis are not that high. In this blog, we ask whether China sits on a property bubble, which tend to end in violent and drawn-out recessions.